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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of the current war on drugs, Congress enacted 21 U.S.C.
section 853,1 the drug proceeds forfeiture statute. The statute autho-
rizes criminal forfeiture of assets that are used in the commission of, or
constitute the proceeds from, a federal drug felony.2 When prosecutors
began to use the statute to seek forfeiture of defense counsel's attor-
ney's fees, defendants and the law firms that represented them argued
that the provision violated the sixth amendment right to counsel.3
The courts of appeals were divided on the question of whether the
sixth amendment prohibits forfeiture of assets intended to be used to
1377
1. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
2. See infra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1466 (5th Cir. 1986).
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hire an attorney.4 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in the com-
panion cases of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States5 and
United States v. Monsanto.6 The Court held that the sixth amendment
right to counsel did not mandate an attorney's fees exception to crimi-
nal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. section 853.
7
This Note examines the Court's decisions in Caplin & Drysdale
and Monsanto in light of the history of the sixth amendment and the
new drug proceeds forfeiture statute. Part II briefly surveys several rel-
evant aspects of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Part III reviews
the legislative history and key provisions of section 853. Part IV sum-
marizes the Supreme Court's holdings in Caplin & Drysdale and Mon-
santo. Part V balances the conflicting interests and suggests an
alternative holding. Finally, Part VI concludes that the greater signifi-
cance of the Supreme Court's decision is its role in a larger erosion of
constitutional protections motivated by the drug war.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense."8 While a comprehensive survey of the right to
counsel is beyond the scope of this Note, a brief discussion of several
relevant aspects of this right is useful.9
A. Appointed Counsel
Powell v. Alabama0 properly may be viewed as the cornerstone of
the right to counsel." Ironically, however, the Supreme Court based its
analysis in that case on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
4. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 80-84 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that right
to counsel does not exempt property earmarked for attorney's fees from forfeiture), vacated on
rehearing, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989); United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2d 905, 926 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that forfeitures which deprive an accused of the ability to
employ private counsel violate the sixth amendment), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. on
rehearing, In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); Thier,
801 F.2d at 1471 (holding that right to counsel of choice is a factor to be considered in granting an
asset-freezing injunction).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
6. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
7. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
9. For a more complete discussion of the sixth amendment right to counsel, see 2 W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1-.10 (1984) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL].
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 11.1(a), at 2.
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ment,12 not the sixth amendment. In Powell the Court held that, under
the unique circumstances of that case, the trial court's failure to ap-
point counsel to represent defendants charged with capital crimes un-
dermined the fundamental fairness of the proceeding and constituted a
denial of due process. 13
In Johnson v. Zerbst14 the Court used the basic concepts of fairness
underlying Powell and held that criminal defendants have a sixth
amendment right to appointed counsel in federal prosecutions. 5 The
Court subsequently applied this sixth amendment right to the states via
the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright.1
6
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Powell Court also laid the foundation for the requirement that
criminal defendants must have effective assistance of counsel. The
Court stated that providing counsel under circumstances that precluded
effective aid at trial amounted to providing no counsel at all and vio-
lated the requirement of due process.1
7
The Court outlined the sixth amendment analysis for determining
whether a defense attorney has rendered ineffective assistance in
Strickland v. Washington. 8 To establish ineffective assistance of coun-
sel and obtain a new trial, defendants must satisfy a two-prong test.
First, it must be shown that the attorney's performance failed to satisfy
an objective standard of reasonableness. 9 Second, the defendant must
demonstrate prejudice by establishing a reasonable probability that,
but for the attorney's inadequate performance, the result of the trial
would have been different.2 °
12. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
13. Id. The Court held:
In the light of the facts outlined in the forepart of this opinion-the ignorance and illiter-
acy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment
and the close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the fact that their families
were all in other states and communication with them necessarily difficult, and above all that
they stood in deadly peril of their lives . . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and impera-
tive that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was like-
wise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
14. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
15. Id. at 463.
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
18. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).




C. Counsel Free from Government Interference
Government interference with counsel generally falls into one of
two categories.21 Direct restrictions on counsel's performance constitute
a complete denial of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
In Geders v. United States,22 for example, the Supreme Court held that
the trial court's refusal to permit a defendant to speak with his attorney
during the overnight break between his direct and cross-examination
amounted to a constructive denial of the defendant's right to counsel.23
The Supreme Court evaluates indirect government interference in
the attorney-client relationship, on the other hand, similarly to denials
of the right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland. In Wea-
therford v. Bursey24 the Supreme Court held that the presence of a gov-
ernment agent at a meeting between the defendant and his attorney did
not violate the sixth amendment. 25 The Court noted that the agent
needed to be present at the meeting to preserve his secret identity and,
because the agent did not reveal any details of the meeting to the pros-
ecution, his presence did not interfere with the attorney's representa-
tion.26 In United States v. Morrison2 the Court held that, even if the
government's intrusion into the attorney-client relationship was unjus-
tified, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial on sixth amendment
grounds unless the intrusion caused actual prejudice to the defendant.28
D. Counsel Free from Conflicts of Interest
The right to counsel free from conflicts of interest arises from the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Courts long have held that a
defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel includes the right
to counsel's undivided loyalty.29 Whenever an attorney represents con-
flicting interests, representation of each of those interests necessarily is
defective.30
21. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 11.8(a), at 70; id. § 11.8(c), at 73.
22. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
23. Id. at 91.
24. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
25. Id. at 558.
26. Id. at 554-58.
27. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
28. Id. at 367.
29. See, e.g., People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441 (1968), cited in LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 11.9(a), at 76 n.1.
30. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1989) (stating that "[a]
lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1980) (providing that
"[a] lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests"
1380 [Vol. 43:1377
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The Supreme Court defined the applicable sixth amendment stan-
dard of review in Cuyler v. Sullivan." Unlike Strickland, Sullivan held
that a defendant who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel on the
basis of counsel's conflict of interest does not have the burden of prov-
ing that the conflict resulted in prejudice.32 Instead, the defendant sim-
ply must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest negatively
affected the attorney's performance to be entitled to a new trial on
sixth amendment grounds.3 3 A presumption of prejudice arises as a con-
sequence of the attorney's divided loyalties. 4
E. Counsel of Choice
The Powell Court also helped define the sixth amendment right to
counsel of a defendant's own choice. The Court indicated that criminal
defendants must have a fair chance to secure the counsel of their own
choice, 35 but this right is not absolute.3 6 Indigent defendants, for exam-
ple, have no right to select counsel that they cannot afford.
3 7
Even a defendant who can afford to hire desired counsel may find
that important governmental interests outweigh the sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice. In Wheat v. United States8 the Supreme
Court held that a defendant's right to counsel of choice did not extend
to representation by an attorney with an actual or potential conflict of
interest. 9 The Court cited the federal courts' independent interest in
the appearance of fairness as a justification for refusing to permit a de-
fendant to waive the right to conflict-free counsel in favor of counsel of
choice. 0
III. DRUG PROCEEDS FORFEITURE STATUTES
The legislature initially justified modern criminal forfeiture as giv-
ing law enforcement officials an additional weapon to combat organized
crime.41 While individual members of criminal syndicates could be fined
or imprisoned, the "economic power bases" that were built with the
(footnote omitted)).
31. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
32. Id. at 349-50.
33. Id. at 350.
34. See id. at 349.
35. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
36. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 11.4(c), at 38.
37. Id. § 11.4(a), at 34.
38, 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
39. Id. at 1697.
40. Id.




proceeds of criminal activities would remain behind. Criminal forfeiture
of these assets was thought to provide the perfect mechanism for elimi-
nating the profit incentives behind organized crime and destroying its
residual economic power.42
A. Legislative History
In 1981 the General Accounting Office released a study of the effi-
cacy of existing federal criminal forfeiture provisions.43 The report con-
cluded that criminal forfeiture had failed to meet Congress's initial
expectations for two reasons. First, federal agencies were not using the
criminal forfeiture statutes as aggressively as possible. Second, the stat-
utes themselves contained restrictions and ambiguities that limited
their usefulness.
44
In the wake of the General Accounting Office report, Congress initi-
ated a bipartisan effort to improve the criminal forfeiture provisions.45
As part of its effort, Congress sought to expand the applicability of
criminal forfeiture to drug felonies. Reflecting its roots as a weapon
against organized crime, the original criminal forfeiture statute applied
only to "continuing criminal enterprises"-groups of five or more com-
mitting a series of drug felonies.46 Congress extended the reach of the
forfeiture law and enacted 21 U.S.C. section 85341 to permit forfeiture
of all property used in the commission of, or obtained as a result of, any
federal drug felony.48
Prior to this expansion, the proceeds of drug felonies still were sub-
ject to civil forfeiture.49 Civil forfeiture, however, has certain limitations
that limit its effectiveness. First, civil forfeiture is an in rem action
against the property itself. Because a federal court only has in rem ju-
risdiction over property within its district, civil forfeiture of an individ-
ual's property located in several different districts requires a number of
separate forfeiture proceedings.5 Criminal forfeiture, on the other
hand, is an in personam proceeding in which a district court has juris-




45. Id. at 192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3375.
46. Id. at 209, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3392.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988).
48. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 209, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 3392.
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
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tions often raise the same issues of fact as criminal prosecutions of drug
defendants. Congress, therefore, concluded that a more efficient use of
judicial and prosecutorial resources would result from combining the
two actions by authorizing the simultaneous forfeiture of a defendant's
property during a criminal prosecution.2
B. Key Provisions of Section 853
Title 21, section 853(a) of the United States Code5 3 provides for
asset forfeiture by anyone convicted of specific federal drug felonies.5
Forfeitable assets include property constituting the proceeds from the
felony violation, property used in the commission of the violation, and,
in the case of defendants convicted of a continuing criminal enterprise
under 21 U.S.C. section 848, property associated with that criminal en-
terprise. 55 Section 853(b) 56 clarifies that the definition of property in-
cludes not only real property, but also tangible and intangible personal
property.
57
Section 853(c) 58 applies the "taint" theory to forfeitable property
52. See id.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988). This section provides:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irre-
spective of any provision of State law-
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly
or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission 'of, such violation; and
(3) in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in
violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to any property de-
scribed in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contrac-
tual rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any other sentence
imposed pursuant to this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, that the person forfeit
to the United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise
authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense
may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.
Id,
54. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 210-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG: & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3393-94. For a list of qualifying felony offenses under titles II and III of the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, see id. at 211 n.51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws at 3394 n.51.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 211, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3394.
56. 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1988).
57. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 211, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3394.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1988). This section provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section vests in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.
Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may
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and states that the government's title to the assets vests immediately
upon the commission of the requisite felony offense. 9 Property that is
subsequently transferred to a third party is also forfeitable unless it can
be demonstrated at a special hearing that the transferee was a bona fide
purchaser of the property for value and did not have reasonable cause
to believe the property was subject to forfeiture.6 0
Section 853(d)61 creates a rebuttable presumption that the prop-
erty of a defendant convicted of the requisite felony is forfeitable if the
property was acquired during the period of the commission of the fel-
ony and there is no likely source for the property other than the com-
mission of the felony.6 2 This presumption reduces the government's
burden of having to produce often elusive direct evidence that any par-
ticular asset constituted the proceeds of a drug felony violation. 3
Section 853(e) 4 authorizes district courts to enter protective orders
to ensure the availability of a defendant's assets for forfeiture.6 5 The
court may issue a restraining order, require the defendant to execute a
performance bond, or take whatever action necessary. 6 While such an
order generally requires either the filing of an indictment that seeks
forfeiture of the property" or notice to the defendant and the opportu-
nity for an adversarial hearing,68 section 853(e)(2)69 allows a court to
be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the
United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this
section that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this
section.
Id.
59. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 200-01, 211-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3383-84, 3394-95.
60. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 200-01, 211-12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3383-84, 3394-95.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 853(d) (1988).
62. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 212, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3395.
63. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 212, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 3395.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) (1988).
65. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 202, 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3385, 3396.
66. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 202, 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3385, 3396.
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (1988).
68. See id. § 853(e)(1)(B).
69. Id. § 853(e)(2). This section provides:
A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be entered upon application of
the United States without notice or opportunity for a hearing when an information or indict-
ment has not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States demonstrates
that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect to which the order is
sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that
1384
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enter a temporary restraining order over property ex parte, without no-
tice or a hearing, if the government can establish probable cause to be-
lieve that notice would threaten the availability of the asset.70 Section
853(f)71 further extends the trial court's authority by permitting actual
seizure of potentially forfeitable assets prior to trial if the court con-
cludes that protective orders under section 853(e) would be insufficient
to preserve the availability of the property.
72
Section 853(n)73 establishes the mechanism whereby third parties
may assert a legal interest or title in property that has been ordered
forfeited.74 After an order of forfeiture has been entered, the govern-
ment must publish notice of the order and also provide direct notice to
parties known to have an alleged interest in the property.75 Interested
parties then have thirty days to request an ancillary hearing to resolve
their alleged interests in the forfeited property.76 Following resolution
of these claims, the United States has clear title to the remaining assets
and may warrant good title to all subsequent purchasers or
transferees.77
Section 853(p)78 requires a defendant to forfeit substitute property
provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture. Such a tem-
porary order shall expire not more than ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless
extended for good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an
extension for a longer period. A hearing requested concerning an order entered under this
paragraph shall be held at the earliest possible time and prior to the expiration of the tempo-
rary order.
Id.
70. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 202-03, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3385-86.
71. 21 U.S.C. § 853(f) (1988).
72. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3396.
73. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (1988).
74. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 207, 214, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3390, 3397.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(1) (1988); see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 208, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3391.
76. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2) (1988); see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 208, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3391.
77. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(7) (1988).
78. Id. § 853(p). This section provides:
If any of the property described in subsection (a) of this section, as a result of any act or
omission of the defendant-
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty;
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the value of
any property described in paragraphs (1 through 5).
1990] 1385
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of equal value if the defendant transfers property that would have been
forfeited under the statute to a third party or makes the property oth-
erwise unavailable.79 Congress intended this subsection to remedy a ma-
jor weakness of previous criminal forfeiture statutes by preventing a
defendant from frustrating the purpose of the law by giving forfeitable
assets to a third party and moving the assets beyond the court's
jurisdiction."s
Finally, the subsection of section 853 most relevant to the discus-
sion in this Note is the one conspicuous by its absence. The statute
makes no provision for paying defense attorney's fees or exempting
them from forfeiture. While section 853(o)81 states that the statute
should be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial intent, 2 it does
not definitively resolve the debate over attorney's fees. The lack of an
explicit attorney's fees exception created the need for statutory inter-
pretation by the Supreme Court and also provided the opportunity for
a review of the statute's constitutionality.
IV. SUPREME COURT CONSIDERATION
The United States Supreme Court recognized the potential for con-
flict between the sixth amendment and section 853 in the companion
cases of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States3 and United
States v. Monsanto.4 In a pair of five to four decisions written by Jus-
79. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 201-02, 212, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 3384-85, 3395.
80. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 201, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3384. The remaining subsections of § 853 provide for the execution of forfeiture orders,
see 21 U.S.C. § 853(g) (1988); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 205, 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3388, 3396; disposition of forfeited property, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(h)
(1988); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 205-06, 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs at 3388-89, 3396; enforcement authority of the Attorney General, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)
(1988) (including disposition of forfeitable property, "making due provision for the rights of inno-
cent persons"); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 205-06, 213, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3388-89, 3396; concurrent application of civil forfeiture provisions, see 21
U.S.C. § 853(j) (1988); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 214, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3397; prohibition of interference by third parties, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(k) (1988); S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 206-07, 214, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
3389-90, 3397 (noting that once the criminal case proceeds against a defendant, third parties with
an interest in potentially forfeitable property may not intervene except through an ancillary hear-
ing pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) after an order of forfeiture); jurisdiction of federal district
courts, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(l) (1988); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 207, 214, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3390, 3397; and taking of depositions, see 21 U.S.C. § 853(m)
(1988); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 41, at 207, 214, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3390, 3397.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (1988).
82. Id.
83. 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
84. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). In Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto the Supreme Court ad-
1386 [Vol. 43:1377
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tice Byron White, however, the Court concluded that the use of the
drug proceeds forfeiture statute to seize assets that a defendant in-
tended to use to pay attorney's fees did not violate the right to
counsel.
8 5
A. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States
In Caplin & Drysdale the petitioner, a law firm, sought to recover
legal fees from the forfeited assets of its client, Christopher
Reckmeyer. 8 Reckmeyer allegedly conducted a large drug importation
and distribution operation that constituted a continuing criminal enter-
prise.8 7 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. section 853(a), 8 the indictment against
Reckmeyer included a request for the forfeiture of specific assets in his
possession." The district court, relying on section 853(e), 90 issued a re-
straining order prohibiting Reckmeyer from transferring any of the po-
tentially forfeitable assets. 1
Despite the restraining order, Reckmeyer paid Caplin & Drysdale
25,000 dollars, which the firm placed in an escrow account, for legal
services rendered prior to the indictment. Reckmeyer subsequently pled
guilty and agreed to forfeit the specified assets.2 Caplin & Drysdale
then requested a hearing pursuant to section 853(n)9" to resolve the
firm's claim to the 25,000 dollar escrow account plus an additional
170,000 dollars of Reckmeyer's assets, which Caplin & Drysdale claimed
it was owed for conducting his postindictment defense.9 4 Caplin &
Drysdale argued that the failure of section 853 to provide an exception
for the payment of legal fees violated the sixth amendment.
9 5
The district court granted Caplin & Drysdale's request for a por-
dressed statutory, sixth amendment, and fifth amendment challenges to the application of 21
U.S.C. § 853 against assets intended to be used to pay attorney's fees. While the Court upheld the
use of the statute on all three grounds, the discussion in this Note is limited to the Court's resolu-
tion of the sixth amendment claims.
85. Justice Byron White's majority opinions were joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy. Justice Harry Black-
mun's dissenting opinion in Caplin & Drysdale, which also applied to Monsanto, was joined by
Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens. See Caplin & Drysdale,
109 S. Ct. at 2669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2659.
86. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2649-50.
87. Id. at 2649.
88. See supra note 53.
89. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2649.
90. See supra note 69.
91. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2650.
92. Id. at 2650.
93. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.




tion of the forfeited assets."6 A panel of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's award on sixth
amendment grounds.97 Upon a rehearing en banc, however, the court of
appeals reversed itself and denied Caplin & Drysdale's claim for attor-
ney's fees.98 The firm appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari. 9
The Court began its evaluation of Caplin & Drysdale's argument by
noting that the firm was not claiming that a poor defendant had a right
to the counsel of choice if the defendant could not afford it.' Nor was
the government arguing that the sixth amendment did not guarantee a
defendant's right to be represented by an attorney that the defendant
could afford to hire. 10 The issue was whether the forfeiture of assets
that the defendant intended to use to hire an attorney impermissibly
burdened the exercise of sixth amendment rights. 10 2 The Court con-
cluded that it did not. 03
The Court held that, because 21 U.S.C. section 853(c)'04 transfers
title to the assets to the United States, the defendant no longer has any
claim to their use, whether to hire an attorney or otherwise. 10 5 By anal-
ogy the Court pointed out that a robbery suspect has no constitutional
right to use money stolen from a bank to hire an attorney if the suspect
is arrested. 0 6 Although the money is in the defendant's possession, it is
not rightfully his. The government does not violate the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel if it seizes the money and refuses to
permit the defendant to use it to pay attorney's fees.0"
The Supreme Court rejected Caplin & Drysdale's attempt to dis-
tinguish the government's interest in forfeited assets from a bank's title
to stolen money.10 8 The Court held that section 853(c) grants the
United States full title to the assets under the relation back doctrine0 9
96. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986).
97. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
98. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), afPd sub
nom. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
99. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
100. Id. at 2651-52. The Court reiterated that a "'defendant may not insist on representa-
tion by an attorney he cannot afford.'" Id. at 2652 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
159 (1988)).
101. Id. at 2652.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2652-53.
104. See supra note 58.
105. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2653.
106. Id. at 2652-53.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2653.
109. The use of relation back provisions to grant the government title to assets upon com-
mission of the requisite criminal act has been upheld for over 100 years. See Caplin & Drysdale,
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as soon as the requisite criminal act takes place. 110 Caplin & Drysdale
did not claim that all criminal forfeitures are unconstitutional-merely
those that seek to recover assets a defendant intends to use to hire an
attorney. The Court declined to adopt Caplin & Drysdale's interpreta-
tion of the sixth amendment and refused to distinguish between the
right to counsel and other constitutional rights such as the right to
travel or freedom of religion."" Thus, because the Court was unwilling
to recognize an exception to forfeiture for assets intended to be used for
the exercise of these other constitutional rights, it refused to do so for
the right to counsel.
11 2
The Court also rejected Caplin & Drysdale's claim that a balancing
analysis of the government's interest in the forfeited assets versus the
defendant's sixth amendment rights weighed in favor of recognizing an
exception to forfeiture."13 The Court emphasized three distinct govern-
mental interests in the recovery of assets forfeitable under section 853.
First, the United States has a significant pecuniary interest in any as-
sets it might receive to continue funding its law enforcement efforts.""
Second, because section 853(n) permits recovery by the rightful owner
of any forfeited property, the government has a restitutionary interest
in preserving such property intact."' Third, the government has an in-
terest in fulfilling one of the primary purposes of the criminal forfeiture
provisions-lessening the economic power of criminals committing drug
offenses, including the power to hire expensive private counsel for their
defense."
16
Given these factors, the Court concluded that the government has a
strong interest in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets that
overrides any sixth amendment interest in allowing a defendant to use
the assets to pay for a defense." 7 The Court added that, were it to hold
otherwise, whenever the government took assets that a defendant might
have used to hire an attorney, including ordinary tax assessments, a
violation of the sixth amendment would occur." 8
109 S. Ct. at 2653 (citing United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)).
110. Id. at 2653. The Court noted that it had sustained the operation of a criminal forfeiture
statute as early as 1890 in United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890). Id.
111. Id. at 2653-54.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2654.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2654-55.




B. United States v. Monsanto
In United States v. Monsanto119 the government charged the re-
spondent with operating a continuing criminal enterprise in the form of
a sizable heroin distribution network. The district court granted the
government's motion, pursuant to section 853(e), to freeze several of
Monsanto's assets, including 35,000 dollars in cash. S0 Monsanto then
requested that the court vacate its restraining order to allow him to use
his frozen assets to retain counsel and that it exempt any attorney's
fees he might pay from forfeiture under section 853(c). The district
court, however, refused Monsanto's motion.'2'
Monsanto appealed to the Second Circuit, which refused to over-
rule the district court but remanded the case for an adversarial hear-
ing.122 The court of appeals later vacated this decision and held a
rehearing en banc in which it modified the district court's order to per-
mit the frozen assets to be used to pay for Monsanto's defense. 23 The
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and reversed.
124
In Monsanto the Supreme Court considered whether freezing a de-
fendant's assets before conviction and before the assets are conclusively
held to be forfeitable violates the Constitution.125 The Court concluded
that pretrial freezing of assets is permissible when the trial court's re-
straining order is based on a finding of probable cause that the assets
are forfeitable.
126
The Court noted it previously had authorized the government's
seizure of property upon a showing of probable cause that the property
would be forfeitable. 127 To hold that a defendant's property could not
be restrained prior to trial when the defendant could be placed in cus-
tody would be inconsistent. Because the government could have incar-
cerated Monsanto to assure that he appeared at trial and to protect
public safety, the Court held that a similar restraint on his property to
119. 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
120. Id. at 2660.
121. Id. at 2660-61.
122. United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), vacated on rehearing, 852 F.2d
1400 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989). The government's initial motion to freeze Mon-
santo's assets was heard ex parte. The court of appeals ordered an adversarial hearing at which the
government had the burden of demonstrating the likelihood that the assets were forfeitable. Id.
123. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1400. The court of appeals' reversal of its earlier decision was not
announced until near the end of Monsanto's trial. Because summations were about to begin, Mon-
santo, who had been represented by an appointed attorney, declined the district court's offer to
use his frozen assets to retain private counsel. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661 n.5.
124. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
125. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2666.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983), and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
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protect its "appearance" at trial and society's interest in recovery of the
assets was constitutional.128
The Court rejected Monsanto's argument that a balancing of the
government's interest in the assets and the defendant's intention to use
the assets to obtain counsel mandated that at least some of the assets
be free from pretrial restraint.""9 The Court cited its holding in Caplin
& Drysdale that, after weighing the various interests involved, assets a
defendant had intended to use for legal fees may be subject to forfei-
ture.130 The Court concluded that no constitutional violation occurs
from freezing forfeitable assets prior to trial because prohibiting the use




The dissent in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto criticized the ma-
jority for finding that a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel
of choice was so unimportant that it could be outweighed by the legal
fiction of the government's alleged property interest in forfeitable as-
sets."'32 The dissent claimed that the majority lost sight of several fun-
damental legal interests that the right to counsel of choice serves to
protect. First, the right to hire private counsel fosters a relationship of
trust between the attorney and client that is critical to an attorney's
effectiveness. 33 Second, private counsel can help provide some level of
equality of resources and experience between the government and the
individual it seeks to prosecute. 3  Third, the existence of the private
defense bar serves other institutional interests of the law including the
prevention of excessive socialization by encouraging individual initiative
and the employment of legal specialists to handle particularly complex
or technical matters. 35
The dissent further charged that, if Congress intentionally had
sought to undermine the modern adversarial system of justice, it could
not have selected a better mechanism than attorney's fees forfeiture.3 6
Not only will defendants whose assets are currently restrained or for-
feited be unable to hire their counsel of choice, but also the mere threat
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2666-67.
130. Id.; see supra notes 86-118 and accompanying text.
131. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
132. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2673.
135. Id. at 2673-74.
136. Id. at 2674.
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of future fee forfeiture may make it impossible for many other defend-
ants to find private counsel willing to represent them.137 Even if a de-
fendant is able to find an attorney who will take the case, the possibility
of future forfeiture will continue to undermine the attorney-client rela-
tionship. The threat of forfeiture discourages the attorney from con-
ducting an extensive investigation of the case for fear of failing to
qualify under section 853(c) as an innocent transferee without cause to
know that fees paid might be subject to forfeiture. 138 A conflict of inter-
est between the lawyer and the defendant likely will arise if, for exam-
ple, the government offers to waive asset forfeiture as part of a plea
bargain agreement. The forfeiture provision also gives the government
the power to control and intimidate the attorney by threatening fee for-
feiture if the attorney pursues the client's case too vigorously or
successfully.139
The dissent disagreed that the government's interest in the forfeit-
able assets was so substantial as to outweigh the defendant's sixth
amendment rights.140 The dissent first noted that the government's de-
sire for forfeiture to prevent the defendant from hiring private counsel
did not constitute a legitimate state interest.'" The government's pecu-
niary interest in the property, while admittedly legitimate, was too
weak to justify the resulting interference with the right to counsel of
choice, particularly because this governmental interest arises from the
legal fiction of the relation back doctrine. 42
The dissent strongly criticized the government's use of its already
questionable postconviction interest in a defendant's property to justify
pretrial restraint of those assets. 43 Although a court must determine
probable cause before issuing a restraining order over the assets, the
mere possibility that such an order will be issued has a significant chil-
ling effect on the defendant's ability to retain counsel.4 The dissent
disagreed with the majority's analogy of freezing a defendant's assets to
holding the defendant in custody prior to trial. The government's inter-
ests in the assets are not nearly as compelling as its interests in protect-
ing public safety and ensuring the appearance of a defendant at trial,
which justify pretrial custody.
45
Finally, the dissent argued that section 853 was unconstitutionally
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2675.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2676.
141. Id.
142. Id. See generally supra note 110.





underinclusive. 146 Most providers of services will be protected because
section 853(c) provides an exemption for assets transferred to third par-
ties who do not have notice that the assets may be forfeitable.147 Attor-
neys, however, who properly investigate their clients' cases cannot help
but know that assets may be subject to forfeiture if their clients are
convicted.' 48 The effect of this disparity places the burden of drug pro-
ceeds forfeiture almost entirely upon the defendant's exercise of a con-
stitutionally protected right.'49 The dissent concluded, therefore, that a
balancing analysis of the government's weak pecuniary interests in for-
feitable property against the defendant's compelling sixth amendment
rights clearly weighed in favor of recognizing an exception from forfei-
ture under section 853 for assets used, or intended to be used, to pay
attorney's fees. 50
V. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Balancing Test
Before conducting an independent evaluation of a defendant's in-
terests in sixth amendment rights and the government's interests in for-
feitable assets, it is useful to assess the objectivity of the majority's
analysis in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto. Several factors in the
majority's opinions suggest that the Court is at best ambivalent, and at
worst hostile, toward the constitutional guarantees contained in the
sixth amendment.
First, the most conspicuous factor suggesting prejudice is the ma-
jority's failure to discuss the various sixth amendment values that were
at stake.'' The Court fails to explain how it could possibly balance the
146. Id. at 2677-78.
147. Id. at 2678.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Justice Harry Blackmun concluded his dissent by stating:
In my view, the Act as interpreted by the majority is inconsistent with the intent of
Congress, and seriously undermines the basic fairness of our criminal-justice system. That a
majority of this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the Act as so interpreted will not
deter Congress, I hope, from amending the Act to make clear that Congress did not intend
this result. This Court has the power to declare the Act constitutional, but it cannot thereby
make it wise.
Id.
151. After reviewing the governmental interests allegedly served by forfeiture, the majority
simply concludes that these interests override any sixth amendment rights of criminal defendants.
Conspicuously absent is any discussion of the value of those rights or of how they are affected by
forfeiture. See id. at 2655. Indeed, the dissent is forced to deduce "[t]hat the majority implicitly
finds the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice so insubstantial" because the majority never




competing interests accurately without at least mentioning the interests
of the defendant. The majority criticizes Caplin & Drysdale's balancing
analysis for failing to identify accurately the government's interests in
potentially forfeitable assets.'52 Ironically, the Court makes a similar er-
ror by ignoring the components of a defendant's right to counsel.
Second, the majority either is unaware of the ethical constraints
placed on defense attorneys or chooses to ignore these limitations by
implicitly endorsing the adoption of contingency fee relationships by
the private criminal bar. 153 The Court attempts to minimize the burden
of attorney's fees forfeiture on the exercise of sixth amendment rights
by pointing out that criminal defendants may be able to find attorneys
who are willing to represent them in the hope that the defendants will
be acquitted and able to pay attorney's fees.15 This rationale, of course,
ignores the fact that defense attorneys who are willing to take on such a
case would be forced to inflate their standard fees to break even after
discounting the current fee structure by the probability that the de-
fendant will be convicted, assets forfeited, and the fees uncollectible. 55
The result of such a system is to create compensation on a de facto
contingency fee basis.
Third, the majority refuses to recognize the unique nature of the
right to counsel in the context of criminal forfeiture. 156 The Court
claims that it is unwilling to create an attorney's fees exception to for-
feiture on the grounds that it would then be forced to create an excep-
tion for the exercise of all other constitutionally guaranteed rights, such
as the right to travel or freedom of religion. 57 Such a claim, however,
ignores the fact that the right to counsel is critical not only to ensure
the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial, but also to determine
whether the government may seek forfeiture of the assets in the first
place. The prerequisite to drug proceeds forfeiture is conviction of the
underlying drug felony. 58 By restraining a defendant's assets and inter-
152. Id. at 2654.
153. Id. at 2652. Contingency fees in criminal cases are proscribed by both the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1989) (prohibiting "a contingent fee for representing a defend-
ant in a criminal case"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980) (stating
that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for
representing a defendant in a criminal case").
154. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
155. For a brief illustration of the effect of contingency fee systems on attorney's fees reve-
nues and the need to discount expected income by the probability of winning, see R. COOER & T.
ULEN, LAW AND ECONoMics 484 (1988).
156. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2653-54.
157. Id.
158. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988) (requiring conviction of a specified drug felony before
authorizing criminal forfeiture of assets).
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fering with the defendant's ability to hire well-qualified counsel, the
government increases its chances of obtaining a conviction and thereby
secures its entitlement to the restrained assets. This nexus between the
right to counsel and criminal forfeiture clearly justifies distinguishing
the exercise of sixth amendment rights from other constitutionally pro-
tected liberties and recognizing a reasonable attorney's fees exception
to forfeiture.159
B. Effect of Forfeiture on the Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment interest most directly affected by criminal
forfeiture is the right to counsel of choice. A defendant's ability to exer-
cise this right may be destroyed completely if all the defendant's assets
are forfeited or subjected to pretrial restraint.160 The right to counsel of
choice also is subject to significant indirect interference because of the
chilling effect the threat of future forfeiture has on an attorney's will-
ingness to represent defendants charged with drug related crimes. Even
if a defendant's assets are unrestrained, it may be impossible to hire the
attorney of choice given the possibility that any fees paid might be sub-
ject to forfeiture after trial.1 61 As the Caplin & Drysdale dissent
pointed out, the denial of the right to counsel of choice hurts not only
the individual defendant, but also a number of broad institutional in-
terests served by the private defense bar.'62
Extending criminal forfeiture to include attorney's fees also creates
a potentially serious conflict of interest between criminal defendants
and their attorneys. Government prosecutors could, for example, offer a
plea bargain in which the defendant pleads guilty to certain charges,
but will not have his assets subject to forfeiture. Given the attorney's
own personal interests in those assets for the payment of his fees, the
attorney could not advise his client objectively about whether to accept
or reject the offer. 6 ' While it would be highly unethical for a prosecutor
159. The dissent supports this distinction by recognizing the unique nature of the sixth
amendment right to counsel and its core function in the criminal justice system. Caplin & Drys-
dale, 109 S. Ct. at 2672-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2674-77.
161. See, e.g., Fricker, Dirty Money, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 60 (stating that fee forfeiture
may cause some defense attorneys to quit practicing criminal law or to reduce their representation
of drug defendants); Gallagher, RICO Risks, AB.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 28 (stating that some lawyers
may reject RICO and drug cases to avoid possibility of fee forfeiture).
162. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1989) (stating that "[a] law-
yer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited ...
by the lawyer's own interests"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1980)
(providing that "[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or
reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests").
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to propose such a plea bargain for the purposes of exploiting this con-
flict of interest, the Supreme Court conceded that such exploitation was
possible in Wheat v. United States.' Even if no actual conflict of in-
terest arises, the government's ability to create one constitutes a serious
interference with the attorney-client relationship. This potential con-
flict of interest also interferes indirectly with the right to counsel of
choice by giving the government additional grounds on which to chal-
lenge representation by one's desired counsel." 5
Finally, given the extremely complex nature of many federal drug
prosecutions that seek criminal forfeiture, representation by appointed
counsel raises serious questions about the effectiveness of assistance of
counsel at trial. 6' While the right to appointed counsel is critical to
ensure the fundamental fairness of most criminal trials, it may not be
sufficient in cases involving extremely complex issues of fact and law
that generally are handled only by trained and experienced specialists
within the private defense bar. 6 7 The shortcomings of appointed coun-
sel are further aggravated by the highly deferential standard of review
for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel outlined in Strickland v.
Washington.'"5 Defendants whose assets are subject to pretrial restraint
or forfeiture, without an exception for attorney's fees, may soon find
that the sixth amendment is a right without a remedy.
C. Governmental Interests in Forfeiture
The majority in Caplin & Drysdale identified three governmental
interests served by the drug proceeds forfeiture statute-a pecuniary
interest in the assets themselves, restitution of third-party property
rights, and deterrence of future criminal activity. 6 9 Of these three in-
terests, however, only the deterrence rationale possibly could be charac-
terized as compelling.
While the dissent conceded the legitimacy of the government's pe-
cuniary interest in a defendant's assets, this interest cannot serve as an
independent justification for forfeiture. 170 Clearly, the government re-
ceives an economic benefit from the assets it seizes and may use them
164. 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988).
165. Id.
166. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2673-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. For a detailed discussion of the functions of private defense attorneys in our criminal
justice system and the effect of drug proceeds forfeiture, see Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys'
Fees: Applying An Institutional Role Theory To Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987
Wis. L. REV. 1; see also Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE
Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA L. REV. 493 (1986).
168. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
170. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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to support its activities.' The Constitution, however, gives Congress
ample powers of taxation, 172 and this method is a more appropriate
mechanism for raising revenue and funding law enforcement. The de-
rivative economic benefit of forfeiture, therefore, is secondary to its de-
terrent effect and should not provide a separate and independent
governmental interest. 73
The government admittedly has a legitimate restitutionary interest
in returning forfeitable assets to their true owner. This interest, how-
ever, is not significantly furthered by section 853 because the statute
merely duplicates other remedies that already are available.'74 In fact,
criminal forfeiture actually may destroy a third party's interests in a
defendant's property. Section 853(n) gives third parties only thirty days
in which to challenge the forfeiture of assets in a defendant's custody;
otherwise, the United States is declared to have clear title to the prop-
erty. 75 Anyone who fails to see the published notice or respond within
the deadline might well find that their interest in the property has been
forfeited along with the defendant's, notwithstanding the restitutionary
interests allegedly at stake. Finally, the recognition of a duty to facili-
tate restitution of third-party property rights in forfeited assets also
undermines the government's alleged pecuniary interest in those
assets.' 76
The use of forfeiture to take the profit out of crime and reduce the
economic incentive to engage in future criminal activity provides the
only legitimate governmental interest that is significantly served by sec-
tion 853. The overall deterrent effect of the statute, however, would not
be impaired substantially by recognizing an attorney's fees exception to
forfeiture. Whether money is seized by the government or paid to a pri-
vate attorney, the net economic effect to the defendant is the same; the
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1982 and Supp. V 1987) (creating a fund of forfeited assets for
Justice Department law enforcement activities).
172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
173. Unlike the forfeiture of assets that defendants intend to use to pay attorney's fees, the
general collection of tax revenues constitutes a much less direct interference with the exercise of
core constitutional rights, particularly because the burden is spread across the population as a
whole and generally constitutes only a small portion of total income. Furthermore, the purpose of
taxation-to raise revenue-is less intrusive than the purpose of drug proceeds forfei-
ture-criminal punishment. Cf. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2655-56 (holding that criminal
forfeiture is no different from ordinary tax assessments).
174. The majority fails to demonstrate how traditional legal and equitable remedies for
breach of contract and conversion fail to protect adequately the property interests of third parties
in assets that might be subject to forfeiture. Nor does it explain why third-party property interests
in nonforfeitable assets also should not be given additional legal protections.
175. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
176. Clearly the government cannot claim a pecuniary interest in assets which it undertakes
to return to third parties. To the extent that forfeiture does serve a restitutionary interest, it
necessarily conflicts with any alleged pecuniary interest.
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defendant no longer has possession of the money, which removes the
incentive to commit additional crimes. While the defendant will receive
some benefit from the services of the attorney, this right to counsel is
the very interest that the sixth amendment was designed to protect. As
the Caplin & Drysdale dissent pointed out, the government's desire to
interfere directly with a defendant's ability to hire private counsel is
not a legitimate state interest and cannot serve as an independent justi-
fication for forfeiture.'"
D. Pretrial Restraint of Forfeitable Assets
Balancing a defendant's sixth amendment rights against the gov-
ernment's interest in forfeitable assets becomes even more difficult
when evaluating pretrial restraint of those assets. The majority opinion
in Monsanto, however, ignored the pretrial-posttrial distinction and
simply referred back to its analysis in Caplin & Drysdale."7 8
First, the Court neglected to consider the time-sensitive nature of
the various interests involved. Before conviction a defendant's interest
in sixth amendment rights is at its greatest. The importance of counsel
before a criminal judgment reflects the basic premise of Powell v. Ala-
bama ' 9 that the assistance of counsel is critical both before and during
trial to ensure the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. 80 The gov-
ernment's interests, on the other hand, are at their weakest prior to
trial because the government must discount its interest in the drug pro-
ceeds by the probability that the defendant will be acquitted and assets
will not be forfeited. 8'
Second, the Court's analogy of pretrial restraint of assets to pretrial
restraint of a defendant 82 is fallacious. The primary justifications for
pretrial custody of a defendant are to protect the public safety and
guarantee the defendant's presence at trial.8 3 The government's inter-
ests in a defendant's assets are not nearly as compelling and must be
discounted by their uncertainty. Moreover, even when a defendant is
placed in pretrial custody, the government may not interfere with the
sixth amendment right to counsel.8 4 By applying the Court's own anal-
177. Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
179. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
180. Id. at 57.
181. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1988); see also Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 n.15
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that government's claim to forfeitable assets does not arise until
after the government has secured a conviction).
182. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
183. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 (1989).
184. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (holding that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel vests upon the initiation of judicial proceedings, including pretrial custody).
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ogy of this situation to criminal forfeiture, therefore, ie would con-
clude that the pretrial restraint of potentially forfeitable assets is
permissible only to the extent that it does not interfere with a defend-
ant's sixth amendment rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note concurs with the dissent's view that an accurate balanc-
ing of the conflicting governmental and individual interests mandates
the recognition of an attorney's fees exception to the drug proceeds for-
feiture statute. Such an exception would serve a vast array of sixth
amendment interests while negatively affecting the deterrence of future
drug felonies only marginally.
It should be noted, however, that a wide middle ground exists be-
tween the majority and dissenting opinions. One commentator, for ex-
ample, has advocated that defense attorneys be treated as bona fide
purchasers under 21 U.S.C. section 853(c) with respect to fees paid
prior to the issuance of a pretrial restraining order based on clear and
convincing evidence. 8 5 Even such a limited exception to forfeiture gives
the fundamental values of the sixth amendment right to counsel far
more protection than the rule handed down by the majority.
An independent examination of the Supreme Court's balancing
analysis in Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto suggests that the Court
erred by undervaluing a defendant's sixth amendment rights and over-
estimating the government's interests in potentially forfeitable assets.
Taken alone, these two decisions might be viewed as deeply regrettable
but ultimately tolerable anomalies.
Unfortunately, however, these cases are only a small part of a much
larger erosion of constitutional protections motivated by the current
war on drugs.'8 6 This war already has been used to justify a wide vari-
ety of intrusions into previously protected areas, including mandatory
drug testing of public employees,' s7 the utilization of standardized
profiles for suspicionless searches and seizures,'8 8 and the use of the
185. See Wuslich, Procedural Due Process and the Defendant's Right to Choice of Counsel
Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 83, 113-14 (1988).
186. See generally Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987).
187. See Special Project, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1990).
188. See Special Project, Drug Couriers and the Fourth Amendment: Vanishing Privacy
Rights for Commercial Passengers, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1311 (1990).
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military as a superpolice force both domestically and abroad. 18 The
nagging question that remains behind is which liberty will be the next
casualty of war?
Danton Asher Berube*
189. See Special Project, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of
United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1990).
* The Author would like to dedicate this Note to his wife, Tracy Michelle Berube. He would
also like to thank Professors Donald J. Hall and Rebecca L. Brown of Vanderbilt Law School and
Dr. James R. Beattie for their extremely helpful comments.
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